Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is gearing up for a fence-mending go to to Saudi Arabia subsequent month, hoping for monetary advantages above all as simmering financial woes threaten his political fortunes at home. Erdogan’s journey to the dominion can be one other milestone in Ankara’s quest to reconcile with Arab heavyweights, following normalization with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and overtures with Egypt after years of rivalry.
Erdogan’s plan for a February go to to Riyadh grew to become public data shortly after Ibrahim Kalin, a senior presidential aide, asserted that Ankara would “accelerate normalization steps” within the area this yr. Erdogan blurted the deliberate go to as he left a gathering of Turkish exporters Jan. Three after a businesswoman requested him to resolve commerce hitches with Saudi Arabia. “He is expecting me in February,” Erdogan stated, with out naming his contact.
Was it King Salman or Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, the dominion’s de facto ruler? Officially, the king is meant to be the president’s interlocutor, however normalization would require reconciliation with the crown prince, whom Turkey has held liable for the 2018 homicide of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi within the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The ugly killing fueled bilateral tensions, which had been already on the rise over Turkey’s help for Qatar, hit by a Saudi-led blockade the earlier years. While Erdogan shook his finger on the crown prince, he nonetheless referred to as on King Salman on Muslim holidays to increase congratulations and courtesy.
Erdogan and his cohorts say bilateral ties soured due to the insurance policies of the crown prince, extensively known as MbS, which, in flip, had been influenced by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Muhammed bin Zayed, whom Ankara accused of financing the failed coup try towards Erdogan in 2016. Khashoggi’s homicide got here as a chance for Erdogan to discredit MbS. He blamed the homicide on the crown prince with out overtly naming him, as Ankara leaked info to native and worldwide media that focused MbS. Ankara hoped the worldwide clamor over the killing would block the crown prince’s path to the throne, however to no avail. The government-controlled Turkish media, which vilified MbS as “Abu Minshar” — translated roughly as “master of the saw” — till lately, are actually busy explaining why a brotherly embrace with the Saudis is a should.
The Turkish international minister’s journey to Riyadh in May and the Saudi commerce minister’s November assembly with the Turkish vp in Istanbul had already raised anticipation of a gathering between the leaders. Erdogan reportedly sought to fulfill with MbS throughout his journey to Doha final month, however was informed that the itinerary of the crown prince didn’t align along with his program.
Erdogan is anticipated to pay a return go to to the Emirates Feb. 14, which affords a chance so as to add a Riyadh leg. The Abu Dhabi crown prince held reconciliation talks in Ankara in November, which, in line with a Turkish official, prompted the Saudis to observe swimsuit. “The Saudis felt like they have been getting excluded in this regional reconciliation. They would like to be a part of it,” the official informed the Middle East Eye.
Indeed, Muhammed bin Zayed’s journey to Ankara in addition to the UAE’s promise for $10 billion in investments in Turkey and reported curiosity in Turkish drones may need egged the Saudis on, simply because the Saudis’ direct talks with Iran may need spurred the Emirates to hunt rapprochement with Tehran. And for MbS, inviting Erdogan to Riyadh fairly than squeezing in a gathering in Doha could be a manner of creating amends for the Khashoggi affair.
Yet, Ankara has not misplaced its propensity to barge into geopolitical vacuums with laborious energy, since worldwide curiosity in Turkish army merchandise is on the rise. As Kalin places it, “Regional problems and crises appear bound to continue. But at the same time, Turkey’s capabilities to intervene in such crises, using both soft and hard power, are increasing by the day. … Turkey will continue to strengthen its regional and global alliances, while enhancing its national capabilities, based on a preemptive foreign policy perspective.”
That’s undoubtedly not what Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia anticipate from fence-mending with Turkey. They anticipate Turkey to curb its “interventionist” international coverage in return for higher financial cooperation. Ankara’s failure to ship on these expectations is why its newfound dialogue with Cairo produced solely two rounds of exploratory talks final yr. But the Emirates and Saudi Arabia produce other causes to point out flexibility. Washington’s insurance policies — its want to strike a take care of Iran, its restricted contribution to the struggle in Yemen, its hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan and the perceived dilution of US safety ensures to allies — have prompted regional nations to diversify their ties with actors equivalent to China and India, restore broken relationships and search to average disputes that threaten hostilities.
The Qatar-Gulf reconciliation in January 2021 softened the bottom with Turkey as nicely. Furthermore, the tip of the Saudi-Emirati alliance within the Yemen struggle reverted the 2 nations to their outdated sample of competitors, and neither of them is more likely to watch from the sidelines as the opposite strikes nearer to Turkey.
From Turkey’s perspective, army operations in Syria, Libya and Iraq haven’t achieved the objectives that Ankara hoped for. The Saudis’ assist to the Syrian Kurds and the UAE’s collaboration with the Iraqi Kurds have solely stoked Ankara’s fears. The most urgent issue, nonetheless, is Turkey’s deepening financial turmoil. Faced with sagging ballot numbers, Erdogan wants badly to lure international investments and enhance commerce partnerships to enhance situations forward of elections subsequent yr.
The hanging shift in commerce with Saudi Arabia is a living proof. Amid an unofficial Saudi boycott of Turkish items, Turkish exports to the dominion plunged to a mere $189 million within the first 11 months of 2021, down from $2.5 billion in 2020 and $3.2 billion in 2019. Saudi gross sales to Turkey, in the meantime, hit a report $Three billion within the first 11 months of 2021, up from $1.7 billion in 2020 and $1.9 billion in 2019.
The events may make progress on normalization by conserving economics other than politics. That would require mutual understanding. The Qatar-Gulf reconciliation appears to have led Ankara to imagine that Doha’s neighbors have dropped their demand for the closure of the Turkish army base in Qatar. Yet objections stay to rising Turkish affect within the area. Similarly, Turkey’s efforts to accumulate army bases in Libya, increase its affect within the Horn of Africa or enhance its presence within the Red Sea proceed to irk the Arab heavyweights.
Some of Turkey’s expectations may not materialize both, primarily the hope to erode Arab collaboration with Greece and Cyprus in fuel exploration within the Eastern Mediterranean. And Ankara’s interlocutors are nicely conscious that it seeks to revive financial ties with none concessions from its geostrategic features within the area.
In sum, Team Erdogan’s “positive agenda” rhetoric is supposed to spice up Turkey’s ties with Arab nations, together with the United States and the European Union. Hopes seem excessive that following reconciliation with the Emirates, situations will ripen this yr for normalization with Saudi Arabia in addition to Egypt and even Israel. Such optimism, nonetheless, appears to disregard the disruptive elements that stay in place.